"Like Heidegger, Lipps asks about the being of concrete man. But while Heidegger interprets this being as a phenomenon in the sense of "showing oneself to oneself“ that he has demonstrated, Lipps begins with the question: "To what extent does the constitution of my existence become experience in the manifold meaning of being?“ Lipps is thus closer to Husserl's method of „transcendental guides“. However, unlike Husserl, he is not concerned with the constitution of being; indeed, his question is not even, as in Heidegger's work, in the service of the question of „the being of being“. For Lipps, being cannot be separated from concretion in what. He points out that ‚be‘ different means: Blue ‚is‘ different from Leo and different again ‚is‘ iron, ‚is‘ Rain, ‚is‘ speech, ‚is‘ Stinginess, etc. Therefore, Lipps concludes: "There is no universal ontology.“